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Dreher: Domestic Relations
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
JA=.s

F. DmE=nm*

A. Common Law Marriages
Whenever domestic relations cases are reviewed, there is almost a certainty that their human interest aspects will overshadow whatever cold announcements of legal rules they may
contain. In re Greenfied1 is a good example of this, for if one
witness had not forced a heart-to-heart talk with Mr. Duke
Greenfield a few years before his death or had been less understanding and articulate in recounting that conversation from the
stand, the decision might well have gone the other way.
Over the objection of blood relatives, the probate court of
Greenwood County bestowed the administration of Mr. Greenfield's estate upon Mrs. Louise Greenfield as his common law
wife, and the circuit court affirmed the appointment. The sole
question was whether there had been in fact a common law marriage between Duke and Louise. Just from the looks of things,
there clearly had been. Duke Greenfield, a Jewish gentleman,
had lived in Greenwood for twenty years before his death, and
was apparently an outstanding citizen, being a part-owner and
operator of textile mills there. He owned a fine home overlooking Lake Greenwood and about ten years before his death
Louise Sexton, a Gentile girl then living with her parents in
Greenwood, moved into it with him. They lived there together,
open and continuously, until his death. Louise, a person of unimpeached reputation, acted as the lady of the house and, as the
court said, "carried out with fidelity and devotion the usual
duties and responsibilities of a wife." 2 She bought the groceries,
managed the servants and cared for Duke "in sickness and in
health." Their photographs stood together on the living room
mantel and a sign by the driveway read "Greenfield's-Private."
They entertained prominent and respected married couples of
Greenwood in their home and had this hospitality repaid in
kind. There was nothing whatever in their conduct to suggest
any illicit relationship. All of the objective elements pointed
strongly to a common law marriage.
* Lecturer-in-Law, University of South Carolina.

1. 245 S.C. 595, 141 S.E.2d 916 (1965).
2. Id. at 598, 141 S.E.2d at 917.
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After making this finding, Mr. Acting Justice Legge, who
wrote the excellent opinion for the court, came to the difficult
part of the case. Against these "outward and visible signs" of
marriage, he said were two pieces of evidence which were subjective in nature: (1) the fact that in all of her business dealings
(social security records, etc.) Louise used her maiden name;
and (2) the fact that Duke had stated to several witnesses that
he and Louise were not married and that he had no wife.
Judge Legge found a sufficient answer to these potential
roadblocks-as he put it, "the impact of such inconsistency between conduct and statement" 3-by his parallel conclusions (1)
that many people, perhaps including Louise, never really comprehend the true significance of common law marriages, and
(2) that Duke Greenfield had lived and died with a peculiar obsession about his Jewish surname.
In discussing the latter point, Judge Legge mentioned the
fact that a fear of anti-Semitism was a common trait in Duke's
family, as witness a brother and a sister adopting Gentile names;
but his main reliance was upon the remarkably sensitive and
perceptive testimony of a Mr. Donald McKellar, a close friend
of Duke and Louise for many years. McKellar said that Duke
was holding forth one day on his favorite topic of anti-Semitism
and made the statement that he could not get in the Greenwood
Country Club because he was a Jew--"I can't do this and I
can't do that."4 McKellar said he thought that this was the time
to bring up a broader topic and he told him that if he was not
accepted in certain quarters, it was not because he was a Jew
but because he was living with a woman he was not married to.
He told Duke that if he was overstepping his friendship, he
could be told to shut up. Duke said in effect, "Well, shut up
then," but McKellar said that he persisted and the conversation
opened into a moving revelation of Duke's attitude toward his
Jewishness and also towards his relationship with Louise, who
was present during the whole conversation.
Space here does not permit a detailed analysis of Mr. McKellar's testimony. Judge Legge, obviously delighted with it,
quotes it at length. McKellar told how Duke expressed amazement as to the source of the certainty on the part of McKellar
and the other Greenwood people that he and Louise were not
3. Id. at 599, 141 S.E2d at 917.
4. Id. at 599, 141 S.E2d at 918.
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married, gave his opinion that the law would consider Louise
as his common law wife and permit her to inherit from him at
his death, said that he considered her his wife, and that he
would not mind her going by the name of Louise Greenfield except for the fact that she could get into some hotels easier -with
the name Sexton than she could with his name. It was a striking
conversation strikingly recounted, and it weighed heavily in
the court's conclusion that Duke, despite some statements to the
contrary to people whose business it was not, actually considered
that he and Louise were man and wife.
As to Louise's continued use of her maiden name and statements that she was single, Judge Legge expressed the thought
that this hesitancy to hold herself out as Mrs. Greenfield could
well have come from the settled conviction on the part of a
large segment of the population that the only marriages that
really count are ceremonial marriages. He says in effect that
two groups of people hold this view: those who are ignorant
of common law marriages and those who disapprove of them.
He pointed out, by quoting her testimony, that at least one of
the witnesses who testified that Duke and Louise were not considered in the community as "married" refused to accept the
idea that a marriage could be a marriage that was not ceremonial.
Judge Legge indicated that if Louise, who did not testify, was
herself of the group who do not comprehend the true legal effect
of common law marriages, that this should not bar her from
claiming a common law marriage if she had in fact made one.
There may be a logical fallacy here. How can a person claim a
contractual relationship such as a marriage if he does not know
he has one? Mr. Justice Legge is saying in effect that it is
what you do that matters, not how you yourself might characterize what you have done.
B. Desertion
Adams v. Adams,5 like the 1963 case of Boozer v. Boozer,6 upon
which it relies, holds that one spouse does not establish "cessation
from cohabitation for the statutory period of one year, ' 7 one of
the four essential elements of desertion under South Carolina
law, unless he was actually living apart from the other spouse
5. 244 S.C. 143, 135 S.E.2d 760 (1964).
6. 242 S.C. 292, 130 S.E.2d 903 (1963).
7. 244 S.C. 143, 144-45, 135 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1964).
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for the full year. The husband here claimed that his wife had
refused him sexual intercourse for some months before the
situation forced him to leave home and that this period of abstinence should be included in the required year of cessation
from cohabitation. The court did not rule on this point however, because the husband failed to prove the factual basis for
his claim. His testimony that his wife had left his bed was
uncorroborated and was denied by the wife and another witness.
On cross-examination, the husband had admitted himself that
she "did not completely leave his bed"8 until a date which did
not square with his own theory.
C. Physical Cruelty
Godwin v. Godwin9 was another case without any real legal
significance, the court merely finding that the plaintiff had not
established factually the claimed ground for divorce. The wife
relied on the claim of physical cruelty. She claimed that her
husband had mistreated her on two separate occasions, the first
of which was a claim that the husband had pinched her on the
arm, and the second that he had slapped her. The slapping incident occurred when the husband carried the wife from her
parents' home in an effort to discuss their marital problems. She
thereupon slapped him and the husband retaliated by slapping
her.
D. Alimony
In Nienow v. Nienow1" the circuit court, by an order dated
July 14, 1964, had required the payment of temporary alimony
commencing April 6, 1964, which was the date originally set for
the hearing of the motion for the temporary relief. Each side
blamed the other for the postponement of that hearing but the
court held that fault in this connection was of no consequence
since the trial judge had the right to make the payment of
temporary alimony commence on any date not earlier than that
of the institution of the main action. This is sound and is in
keeping with the basic principle that temporary alimony is
merely a substitute for the support which a husband owes a wife
throughout matrimony. Payment may be required from the date
8. Id. at 145, 135 S.E.2d at 761.

9. 245 S.C. 370, 140 S.E.2d 593 (1965).
10. 245 S.C. 542, 141 S.E2d 648 (1965).
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on which the parties became adversary litigants rather than
married people living together and may extend to the date on
which the court makes a final adjudication of their future status.
The husband, of course, should be given credit for the support
payments which he made voluntarily during this period. The
trial court had done that in the present case.
Cheatham v. Cheatham" was an appeal by a husband on the
sole ground that the trial court had erred in increasing the
amount of alimony and attorneys fees recommended by the
master before whom the testimony had been taken. The court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Brailsford, held that no court
is ever bound in any fashion by the recommendations of a master
and that, in determining the proper amount to be set for alimony,
it is the court's duty to consider the whole record and make its
own determination, with due weight being always given, of
course, to the master's recommendation on the point. To reverse
in the present case, Judge Brailsford said, that the trial court's
findings as to the inadequacy of the sums found proper by the
master would have to be determined to be without any reasonable support in the record. That was not possible on the present
record, the circuit court's finding being amply supported by
evidence.
E. Corroborationand Condonation
In ALaughin v. MoLaughlin'2 the court discusses at some
length the requirement of corroboration of a party's testimony
in a divorce case and also the defense of condonation. The case
seems to have been actually decided on the condonation point.
If so, the pronouncements in regard to corroboration would be
dicta, but since they state the court's attitude on the subject, the
practitioner would be well advised to consider them carefully.
Since Brown v. Brown,13 which was the first case to come before
the court under the present divorce statute, the court has stated
the rule to be that all elements testified to by a party as necessary to make out a cause of action for divorce must be corroborated by either direct or circumstantial evidence. The court has
always said however that, since the corroboration rule is designed to prevent collusion, it may be relaxed when it is evident
11. 245 S.C. 579, 141 S.E.2d 813 (1965).
12. 244 S.C. 265, 136 S.E.2d 537 (1964).
13. 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330 (1949).
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that collusion does not exist. The argument was made in
McLaughlin that if a divorce action is contested, that fact in
itself means there is no collusion, and corroboration of the party's
testimony should not be required. The court refused to accept
such a broad proposition, saying that the required degree of
corroboration may be greater or less in any particular case, depending upon all of its facts and circumstances, including the
possibility of collusion, but that if there is to be no corroboration
at all, the burden is upon the moving party to show why. The
court agreed with the plaintiff that it would be possible to find
the requisite corroboration in the cross-examination of the adverse party but said that corroboration of this type would be
looked upon with suspicion if there was no other. On the record
before it, the court indicated that the wife's testimony as to the
claimed acts of physical cruelty on the husband's part were not
corroborated, even giving consideration to the husband's partial
admissions concerning them, and passed on to discuss and apparently decide the case on her condonation of his conduct.
The parties had continued to live on as man and wife for five
months after the last alleged act of physical cruelty on the husband's part and the court held that under established principles
this fact established a condonation. It recognized that condonations are always conditioned upon there being no recurrence
of the reprehensible conduct but was unable to find any subsequent misconduct on the husband's part of sufficiently serious
nature to revive the condoned offenses. All that the husband did
the night before the wife left home was to lose his temper and
walk away from an argument.
The courts have never been able to state an exact standard by
which to determine whether subsequent bad conduct of a spouse
on probation is sufficient to revoke the earlier condonation and
revive the original offense as a ground for divorce. In the present
case, the South Carolina court says that although the new wrongdoing need not be of itself an offense which would constitute a
ground for a divorce, it should be one "approaching a marital
offense and partaking in at least a substantial degree of such an
offense."1 4
One interesting thing about the condonation defense in the
McLaughlin case is that the husband did not raise it in his pleadings or before the referee or in the circuit court. The court held
14. 244 S.C. 265, 275, 136 S.E.2d 537, 542 (1964).
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that this made no difference and that if the evidence showed
condonation "it is the duty of the court even without pleading
to find to that effect." 5 This is the first time our court has
taken this position but it is obviously sound. If we once say that
the court is bound by positions which the parties take in divorce
cases, we are agreeing to divorce by consent. We cannot admit
that as possible.
F. Jurdition
Foster v. Nordman' 6 -was an action in the court of common
pleas for York County to annul a marriage entered into in that
county between North Carolina residents, the plaintiff alleging
that he was forced into the marriage by duress and coercion and
that it was never consummated. At the time the action was
brought, he and the defendant were still residents of North
Carolina and service was had upon her under section 20-45 of
the South Carolina Code. The circuit court granted relief to
the defendant on her counterclaim for a divorce a mensa et thoro
with support for herself and her unborn child and the plaintiff
appealed. The defendant appealed on the court's refusal to make
the child a party to the action following its birth pendente lite.
The court refused to hear the merits of either appeal, holding
on its own motion that the South Carolina court never had
jurisdiction to entertain an annulment action between North
Carolina residents. In EverZy v. Baumi' 7 the court held that
there was jurisdiction in the South Carolina court to annul a
marriage which had been contracted in Georgia between residents
of South Carolina, specifically reserving the question of whether
the courts of the place of the celebration of the marriage would
also have jurisdiction to annul it. This question is now answered
in the negative. The authorities are in some conflict on the
point but our court adopts what is apparently the majority view
and one that is in keeping with the basic principle in all litigation involving marriage that domicile of at least one of the
parties is necessary to establish jurisdiction.
In liMldand County Dept. of Welfare v. Aickens- it was
held in a carefully reasoned opinion by Mr. Justice Bussey that
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 272, 136 S.E.2d at 540.
244 S.C. 485, 137 S.E.2d 600 (1964).
209 S.C. 287, 39 S.E.2d 905 (1946).
246 S.C. 113, 142 S.E2d 737 (1965).
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the juvenile-domestic relations court for Richland County did
not have jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of a natural
mother to her child, the action having been brought pursuant to
the provisions of sections 31-51.1 to -56 of the South Carolina
Code. Although some broader principles are discussed, the decision was primarily one of statutory construction and would
not be of general interest other than as a reminder that the
statutes creating our now numerous courts of limited jurisdiction should always be carefully examined before bringing any
unusual litigation in them.
G. Legislation
Pursuant to the new policy of referring in these articles to
recent legislation in the field of the topic surveyed, attention
is called to an act requiring doctors who examine children to
report to the proper authorities all injuries other than accidental
which they might have cause to believe were inflicted by a parent
or other person having custody of the child. It further provides
that anyone making such a report shall be immune from any
liability for his actions. 19

19. S.C. Acts & J. REs. 1965, p. 105.
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